Finnish Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy on the Way towards the Euro by Tapio Korhonen
430 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 53, 2003, ã. 9-10
UDC: 338.23:336.74(480);339.74(480)
Keywords: monetary policy – foreign exchange policy – EMU – euro – monetary policy arrangements
Finnish Monetary and Foreign
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1. Finnish Economy Already Adjusted to Integration pre-1990s
When the heads of the European Community states agreed on the gra-
dual transition to Economic and Monetary Union in Maastricht on 10 De-
cember 1991, the project was not immediately seen as something that would
directly affect Finland. Finland’s membership to the European Union see-
med a distant possibility and the realisation of the single currency concept
within the proposed timeframe was generally regarded with scepticism.
Finland had already participated in Western Europe’s integration process
for decades. Finland’s foreign trade had been liberalised in the 1950s. Fin-
land was very much involved in European economic organisations, despite
some constraints imposed by its foreign policy of that period. Finland had
become a member of OECD (1969) and EFTA (1961, with full membership
in 1986). In 1972 there had been negotiations with the European Commu-
nity on a free trade agreement, and in 1991 cooperation centred on negoti-
ations on theestablishment of theEuropean Economic Area. TheEEAagree-
ment came into force in 1994, meaning that from this time on most EU
directives also concerned Finland.
The Finnish economy had already become highly integrated with the in-
ternational economy. Finnish industry developed a competitive edge, par-
ticularly in the forestry sector and metal and engineering industries. Fo-
reign trade was centred on Western Europe; albeit business with the Soviet
Union accounted for somewhere around a fifth of all foreign trade.
Finland’s economy was typical of the Nordic countries, with the central
government playing a relatively large role, even though tax levels were not
quite as high as in Denmark and Sweden. Productivity rose faster in Fin-
land than in Western Europe on average, virtually closing the economic gap
in standards of living that had appeared after the war. The rapid growth
was achieved at the cost of very high investment levels (25–30 % of GNP).
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of the Bank of Finland.In terms of the real economy, Finland’s overall preparedness for integra-
tion was fairly good. The monetary and inflation requirements posed more
serious problems. Inflation and nominal income had risen almost continu-
ally faster than in the competitor countries. Wage levels were agreed to in
the context of extensive nationally binding collective agreements under
which public authorities were often bound to take certain measures, which
could even include policy decisions on interest rates.
Financial market regulations had been in place in Finland for the entire
post-war period. However, at about the time of the signing of the Maastricht
Treaty, the dismantling of control provisions concerning foreign exchange
activities was completed. Although a step behind the others, Finland follow-
ed the rest of Western Europe along the path to greater liberalisation.
The Bank of Finland liberalised the interest rate system, as regards
the banks, in 1986, after which banks’lending and deposit rates quickly be-
came more market oriented. By the end of the 1980s a market-oriented ap-
proach for regulating bank liquidity had been adopted.
The markka had been pegged to the US dollar up until the early 1970s,
after which the Bank of Finland began to fix the markka’s external value
according to a trade-weighted currency index. The permitted fluctuation li-
mits were at various times 4.5 % or 6 %. The exchange rate generally re-
mained (or was kept) fairly steady within the band. However, because Fin-
land’s inflation rate exceeded that of its trading partners, the markka had
to be devalued at roughly ten-year intervals, by 10–30 %.
In June 1991 the markka was linked to the EC’s official accounting unit,
the European Currency Unit. The ECU-link was not sought after; rather
Finland found itself forced by market pressures to mimic Norway and Swe-
den. The move aroused intense interest despite its modest economic impact,
as ECU countries accounted for over 85 % of the trade-weighted index. All
of the Western European currencies were now linked, admittedly via diffe-
ring mechanisms, and were in practice ‘pegged’to the Deutschemark, which
served to anchor the system.
2. Backdrop for EU Membership and Monetary Union – the Deep
Economic and Banking Crisis of the 1990s
At the time of the Maastricht Treaty, Finland was faced with a deepening
recession; in fact this was an exceptionally deep recession for a western na-
tion (Figure 1). Its roots could be partly found in the domestic economy, 
mainly in long-standing excessive demand, inflated costs and heavy debt
loads at the time. Another causal factor was external: export trade to the So-
viet Union plummeted to a fraction of its previous level as the Soviet Union
disintegrated. In addition, there was a depression within the forestry in-
dustry and high international interest rates. Exports and investment col-
lapsed. Finland’s total output dropped by 7 % in 1991 and continued to fall
the following year. Unemployment rose steeply and the central government
slipped into a pronounced cycle of indebtedness.
The government fiscal deficit (excluding the surplus of employment pen-
sion schemes) rose as high as 6 % of GDP in 1991 and 9 % the following
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FIGURE 1 Finland: Key Economic Indicators
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was a danger that financing could dry up. The government drafted a me-
dium-term plan for 1993–1995, according to which the expenditure increa-
se for 1992–1993 would be followed by a return to the 1991 level by the end
of the plan period.
Immediately before the November 1991 Maastricht meeting, the mark-
ka came under speculative pressure and it became necessary to devalue
the markka by slightly more than 12 % (Figure 2). Conditions in the fo-
reign exchange market remained turbulent after the devaluation.
There were also serious problems in the financial markets. Despite the re-
cession, Finland’s interest rates had to be kept at a high level due to pres-
sures from theforeign exchange market. Theone-month Helibor rates touch-
ed over 20 % in autumn 1991 and again in 1992, under the pressure of de-
valuation speculation (Figure 3 and 4).
With the economic crisis came a severe banking crisis. The situation was
exacerbated by thedevaluation-related increase in themarkka-value of asi-
zeable foreign currency-denominated debt. While thefactors behind theban-
king crisis were primarily associated with problems in the real economy,
a lack of preparedness for financial deregulation on the part of market par-
ticipants exacerbated the situation. An accumulation of pent-up demand for
credit was suddenly released with the deregulation of the market. More-
over, borrowers were not prepared for the possibility of high market rates.
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4.5%A tax system that favoured borrowers was not reformed before the crisis
hit.
The Bank of Finland has been widely blamed for the too rapid deregula-
tion and poor timing prior to economic overheating and the recession that
followed. In retrospect, the criticism may be fair, albeit in 1986, when de-
regulation was perhaps in its crucial phase, economic growth and the out-
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FIGURE 3 Monetary Policy Interest Rates
Source: European Central Bank; Bank of Finland
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Germany, 10-yearlook were fairly weak. There has also been heavy criticism of Finland’s hol-
ding tightly to a fixed foreign exchange rate that was almost 20 % overva-
lued, in real terms, based on its average over the previous several decades
(Figure 5).
The roots of the problems stretched back to the 1980s. There were se-
rious problems in the late 1980s concerning appropriate policies for re-
straining a surprisingly strong economic boom. The freeing of capital flows
began to have a pronounced effect on monetary policy. Attempts at mone-
tary tightening failed as foreign capital streamed into Finland, which also
increased exchange rate risks for the private sector. Monetary policy had
lost its effectiveness in the context of a fixed exchange rate.
In the early 1990s the feeling at the Bank of Finland was that a small
devaluation would be impossible to control, as it would only add to ex-
change rate pressures. A switch to a floating exchange rate regime under
these conditions was totally excluded if only for political reasons. Exchange
rate policy was also strongly affected by the European fixed rate environ-
ment.
In the light of experience, these factors took on disproportionate impor-
tance; the fixed rate system soon failed in many other countries, and the in-
flation pick-up remained subdued in Finland and in other countries. On
the other hand, in ex post assessments the timing of the devaluation was
overemphasised.
The bulk of banks’ loan losses were accounted for by savings banks.
The central financial institution of savings banks had to be taken over by
the Bank of Finland, and it was later turned over to the Government Gua-
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FIGURE 5 Markka’s Real Exchange Rates
Note: Rising curve indicates markka depreciation.
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% Index, period avg = 100rantee Fund for dismantlement. The branches of the failed savings banks
were sold to other banks. On 23 February 1993, Parliament approved a re-
solution requiring that the Finnish State guarantee Finnish banks’ ability
to meet their commitments ‘under all circumstances’; otherwise the banks
would have found themselves in a deep crisis because of foreign liabilities.
It is estimated that the banking crisis cost Finnish taxpayers the equi-
valent of some 7–8 % of the annual GDP of that time. On the other hand,
banking operations underwent rapid rationalisation in the years that fol-
lowed, e. g. via staff cuts of 50 %. The Finnish banking sector became one
of Europe’s most efficient banking sectors. In terms e. g. of technology, sett-
lement systems run by Finnish banks already had a long history of high ef-
ficiency.
3. Run-up to EU Membership – Markka Floated (1992–1994)
An entirely new light was cast on Finland’s foreign currency and mone-
tary policies in the early part of 1992, as the government set its sights on
becoming amember of theEuropean Union. Anessential part of asuccessful
bid for membership was acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty in full and
the implied agreement to join the single currency and single monetary po-
licy.
The Bank of Finland’s foreign reserves declined to a very low level as a re-
sult of speculative bouts in autumn 1991 and spring 1992 (Figure 6). In au-
tumn 1992, pressure on the Finnish markka became unbearable. The Bank
of Finland’s foreign exchange position, including support loans, became ne-
gative. It became necessary to float the markka on 8 September 1992.
The markka’s external value fell immediately by another 10 %.
Not long after this the ERM itself fell. Thus the Western European ex-
change rates were starting to fluctuate again. In August 1993, the EU cent-
ral bank governors and finance ministers decided to widen the fluctuation
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countries were able to maintain fairly stable mutual exchange rates.
The economic crisis had by that time resulted in a considerable lowering
of Finland’s international credit rating. Banks’ foreign funding was limited
to short-term borrowing, and spring 1993 saw afurther reduction of thecent-
ral government’s credit rating. On the other hand, the position of export
companies had strengthened considerably, having so far enjoyed a devalu-
ation of about 30 %. After a brief but critical period, the central govern-
ment’s foreign financing sources became more readily accessible, and this
fostered high levels of borrowing from abroad in the following years.
Although the international export markets were still weak in 1993, Fin-
land’s exports posted robust growth. A current account deficit that had per-
sisted almost continuously for decades finally disappeared. GDP, after de-
clining by more than 10 % over a two to three year period, recorded a slight
increase in 1993 and a strong pick-up in 1994. Rapid growth of 4–6 % p. a.
continued to the end of the decade. However, for many years demand was
strongly biased toward exports while domestic demand remained sluggish.
Growth and exports were supported by the exceptional success of the Fin-
nish telecommunications industry (Nokia) at that time, which contributed
roughly 0.5–1 percentage point to the annual growth rate in the last years
of the decade. All in all, economic balance – excluding unemployment – was
fairly well achieved.
The markka float was initially viewed as a temporary measure, but it was
soon realised that conditions were not ripe for quickly re-establishing a fi-
xed exchange rate. On 13 November 1992, the Council of State amended
the Currency Act, authorising the Bank of Finland to abandon the limits
on the markka’s fluctuation range for an unspecified period.
The markka floated for about half a year without a clearly defined an-
chor for monetary policy. In February 1993 the Bank of Finland adopted
a new policy of inflation targeting. The aim of monetary policy would be to
stabilise inflation (CPI inflation, excluding the effects of indirect taxes,
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Partly due to the moderate wage agreements, inflation was already close
to the desired level (Figure 7).
The foreign exchange market was marked by a great deal of uncertainty
throughout 1993, and the Bank of Finland smoothed out fluctuations in
the exchange rate via fairly large interventions in both directions. The ea-
sing of monetary policy could only be done gradually. Nonetheless, interest
rates declined over the course of the year, until they were virtually on a par
with German rates.
Over time, the markka float proved to be more stable than anticipated.
The markka continued on the upward trend that had begun in 1993, mo-
ving toward its prefloat level, which helped ensure attainment of the in-
flation objective. The markka’s depreciation had clearly been excessive.
4. Monetary Policy Arrangements and Market Institutions 
in the 1990s
4.1 Monetary Policy Arrangements
The monetary policy regime was already highly market-oriented. The key
elements were (1) a permanent minimum reserve system, based on bank
deposits, (2) open market operations, which were the prime means of exer-
cising control over bank liquidity, and (3) the liquidity facility, which ensu-
red that a bank could automatically acquire or invest liquidity.
A new minimum reserve system entered into effect in July 1993. The re-
serve ratio varied between 1 % and 2 %, depending on the liquidity of
the account, and no interest was paid on reserve deposits. Later, in Octo-
ber 1995, the system was changed so that reserve requirements were met
on the basis of monthly averages instead of fixed monthly amounts. With
the new averaging feature, the system was now an integral part of banks’
daily liquidity management.
Liquidity was controlled via open market operations, which, in the early
phase, took the form of direct transactions with banks, largely in bank CDs.
These operations were not conducted on a fixed time schedule but rather
in accord with current conditions. Because banks generally had ample li-
quidity, the Bank of Finland also frequently absorbed liquidity by issuing
its own CDs.
In July 1992 the Bank of Finland adopted an auction (tender) system. For
the first couple years, the new system was based on variable-rate tenders.
The operations were usually based on a maturity of one month, albeit occa-
sionally three-month or even one-year maturities were applied. In Decem-
ber 1994 the Bank of Finland switched to fixed rate (i.e. quantity) tenders,
which underlined the role of the tender rate as the key signalling mecha-
nism of monetary policy. With the introduction of fixed rate tenders, banks’
bids quickly grew to many times their liquidity needs. Starting in March
1996, the Bank of Finland accepted the banks’ bids in full, which forced
them to gauge their bids realistically.
In addition, the monetary policy instruments included the liquidity faci-
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reserve) rate were defined as margins vs. the tender rate. In 1993 both mar-
gins were set at 2 percentage points, where they remained until the end of
the era of national monetary policy. The maturity of liquidity credit was ge-
nerally one week. 
Overall, the monetary policy instruments were relatively effective and
were not changed much during the final years of national monetary policy.
4.2 Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market
At best, the Bank of Finland’s foreign reserve assets were only slightly
above the international average, at about 10 % of GDP (Figure 7). Due to
frequently occurring pressures, the foreign reserves tended to fall sub-
stantially below the Bank’s target level. The Bank pursued an active po-
licy of investing its reserves. The US dollar was the most important cur-
rency, but the European currencies together accounted for the bulk of
the investments.
Often in the face of exchange rate pressures, forward interventions were
resorted to. Foreign currency could be sold without a visible reduction in
foreign reserves until the forward agreements expired several months la-
ter. Forward exchange agreements also enabled delay of the effects of cur-
rency pressures on liquidity in the domestic money market and hence to
an extent performed the task of open market operations. Both domestic and
foreign companies used forward exchange agreements for speculative pur-
poses, and these were the primary means of capital flight. The volume was
perhaps affected by the fact that the forward markets were largely dere-
gulated already at the start of liberalisation in 1980. 
Problems in the currency markets and concerning liquidity management
sometimes arose as a result of the old practice by which the central go-
vernment handled its currency operations via theBank of Finland. Thecent-
ral government’s foreign currency operations did not affect the exchange
rate but did have major impacts on the amount of foreign reserves and bank
liquidity. The central government’s foreign currency-denominated debt re-
mained excessive in the latter half of the decade, amounting to about a third
of GDP.
Defending the markka via interventions was sometimes costly to the Bank
of Finland. The government in 1996 provided compensation for part of
the costs related to the banking crisis. Nor was the Bank able to turn over
any earnings to the central government for over a decade. One factor in
the Bank’s poor financial results was the fact that the amount of banknotes
in circulation was extremely low by international standards. This was lar-
gely due to an extensive bank branch network and efficient payment system.
4.3 Changes in the Banking System
The Finnish banking system had functioned in a highly stable manner
for decades. Up until the 1990s the banking markets were dominated by
five banks/banking groups, consisting of two large commercial banks and
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cooperative banks. In Helsinki there were a few small commercial banks
and subsidiaries of foreign banks. Postipankki operated largely in the man-
ner of a commercial bank – partly via the post offices – but was in a spe-
cial position vis-à-vis central government payments. Thus the government
did not hold its financial assets at the Bank of Finland.
A legacy of the regulation era was the large number of national features
of the financial markets. The markets were highly bank-centred. The se-
curities markets were relatively unimportant. The interest rate system and
taxation of financial assets had particularly national features; most bank
deposits and bonds were variable-rate instruments. A broad system of re-
ference rates was put in place, which included – in addition to the traditi-
onal base rate – LIBOR-type HELIBOR rates and bank-specific prime ra-
tes set by individual banks.
The banking crisis, broad internationalisation and gradual preparation
for EU integration gave rise to an adaptation of the financial system to
a new situation. The Finnish banking system was almost completely re-
vamped in the 1990s. At the start of 1995 the two largest commercial banks
were merged into a single institution, and at the end of the decade the bank
joined the Nordic banks’ merger trend. Postipankki discontinued its postal
activities and lost its legally mandated status as regards government pay-
ments. Despite this concentration of banking business, the banks’ competi-
tion has tightened. The interest rate margin has narrowed, mainly as a re-
sult of declining rates on household lending.
5. The EU-era Float Prior to Joining the ERM
5.1 Maastricht Criteria
Finland joined the EU at the start of 1995, along with Sweden and Aus-
tria. Referenda on joining were held in autumn 1994. Uncertainty about
the outcome caused a rise in interest rates and a slight depreciation of
the markka in summer 1994. In order to curb the rise in interest rates,
the Bank of Finland allowed for a relatively high level of liquidity in the mo-
ney market, and the markka was supported with small interventions.
The positive vote eased the situation, and during the latter part of the year
themarkka appreciated by nearly 10%, in terms of both theECU and thefo-
reign trade-weighted index. In the summer it became possible to repurchase
foreign currency, and foreign exchange reserves grew substantially for
the whole year 1994. The tender rate fluctuated, most of the year just over
5% , but ended the year slightly above 5.5 %.
Before Finland joined the EU, the Bank of Finland signed agreements
with other EU central banks on the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM),
which was a part of the EMS, and a short-term financing arrangement. How-
ever, Finland, unlike Austria, did not join the ERM. Pegging the markka
within the ERM was not deemed realistic – from the viewpoint of either
Finland or the ERM countries – in light of the recent period of uncertainty.
Finland at the time was fairly far from meeting the four detailed con-
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membership. At the time, it seemed that Finland was able to easily fulfil
only theinflation criterion (average CPI inflation for theyear before theexa-
mination not to exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points that of the three
best performing Member States). The CPI rose at an annual rate of only
about 1% in thelatter part of 1994, although there was concern about theef-
fects of the wage settlement agreed.
Finland’s general government debt clearly amounted to less than 60 % of
GDP, but the general government deficit for 1994 had again amounted to
more than 5 % (the limit was 3 %). The long-term yield on government bonds
had risen, along with international yields, back to around the 10 % level –
clearly above the interest rate criterion. On the other hand, it seemed fair-
ly certain that the interest rate criterion would be met if the other criteria
were met.
The exchange rate criterion (compliance with the ERM for at least two
years) caused the most concern. The markka’s exchange rate had been ex-
tremely volatile. It had started on a clear upward trend and by end 1994
had nearly reached the pre-float level. Floating was in fact seen as benefi-
cial as a means of determining a realistic and stable exchange rate.
An additional requirement set out in the Maastricht Treaty was that
the central bank be guaranteed independence as regards monetary policy.
Although the Bank of Finland had been relatively independent of the go-
vernment, it was clearly subordinate to Parliament. The fact that the Bank
was not independent of the government became quite clear in spring 1992
when the Governor of Bank of Finland was forced to resign as a result of
a dispute with the Prime Minister.
5.2 Monetary Conditions Were Favourable at First but Unsettled
in 1996
EU membership did not immediately affect Finnish monetary policy in
any essential way. Integration, however, did mean that developments rela-
ted to the monetary policy regime and financial institutions in general were
guided to a greater extent by events in other EU countries. The Bank of
Finland participated in preparatory work within the EMI, e. g. in the de-
velopment of Eurosystem monetary policy instruments.
The Finnish markets remained calm, and the markka continued to ap-
preciate slowly up to year-end. In connection with a rise in international
interest rates, the Bank had raised the tender rate in December 1994. In
February the rate was raised to 5.75 %, and in June to 6 %. By December
1995 the tender rate had fallen to 4.25 %. The traditional – but no longer
highly significant – base rate was lowered at that time to 4.75 %, which was
half of its peak level of 9.5 % reached in 1992.
The decline in interest rates was enabled by a decline in inflation and in-
flation expectations to less than 2 %, in fact nearly to zero. Thus the infla-
tion target for 1995 was achieved, albeit this was partly due to a one-off
drop in food prices in connection with EU membership.
Toward the end of 1995 the markka began to depreciate. The weakening
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temporary sluggishness in the Finnish economy. Especially the domestic
markets expressed the view that the markka was then too strong for
the ERM link-up. The Deutschemark rose in value from FIM 2.97 in De-
cember 1995 to a peak of FIM 3.16 in May 1996. More than 10 % of foreign
exchange reserves were sold.
In May the market pressures were reversed, probably due in part to par-
liamentary approval of a change in the Currency Act that enabled more fle-
xible decision-making in connection with the ERM link-up. Foreign inves-
tors began to have confidence in the markka and its readiness for the ERM.
In the summer the markka again appreciated vs. the Deutschemark, to
a FIM/DEM rate of 3.
It was again possible to lower the level of Finnish interest rates. In July
the tender rate was already down to 3.5 %, and in October it was lowered
to 3 %, i.e. the same as the Bundesbank’s repo rate. The differential vs. Ger-
many for the yield on ten-year government bonds narrowed to about one-
-half percentage point. In terms of interest rate level, Finland had reached
the average for ERM countries.
6. Membership in the EU’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
6.1 ERM Linkup in October 1996
In the environment of the European Union, the Bank of Finland and
the government together had explored the prospects for linking the markka
to the ERM. The exchange rate and the financial markets had gradually
stabilised in accord with objectives, nor did ERM countries any longer ex-
press doubts as to Finland’s eligibility for the ERM. The government’s out-
spoken goal was for Finland to be part of the first wave of countries to en-
ter Stage Three of EMU.
The key issue to be decided – not only for Finland but for other EU count-
ries as well – was therate at which themarkka should be linked to theERM,
against the background that the rate chosen was to be consistent with the fi-
nal conversion rate for changeover to a single currency. Although the deci-
sion formally concerned the markka’s ECU rate, it was in fact taken on
the basis of the exchange rate vs. the Deutschemark. The FIM/DEM rate
had been highly volatile during the 1990s. Before the markka devaluation
in 1991, the FIM/DEM rate was about FIM 2.30–2.40. The markka hit its
weakest level in 1993 when the FIM/DEM rate was 3.60. The fact that
the markka was floating facilitated the choice of an appropriate exchange
rate. In 1995–1996 the markka had fluctuated between FIM 3.16 and
FIM 2.95, gradually stabilising at about FIM 3.
Extensive studies of the equilibrium exchange rate were also conducted
at the Bank of Finland, but the results varied greatly. It was feared that
too weak an exchange rate would generate inflationary pressures, especi-
ally considering that the interest rates were to be fixed at a low level. On
the other hand, a relatively weak ECU central rate could be justified e. g.
by thecontinued heavy external indebtedness of theFinnish economy (about
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was very strong vis-à-vis the dollar.
On 12 October 1996 the government finally decided to join the Finnish
markka to the ERM. The markka’s central rate was agreed within the Mo-
netary Committee, under the ECOFIN Council, in a fairly broad consensus.
The markka’s ECU central rate was set at FIM 5.80661, the bilateral 
Deutschemark central rate being FIM 3.0400. The agreed central rate was
thus close to the average level that had prevailed for the markka vis-à-vis
major ERM currencies over the past couple years.
In connection with the ERM linkup, bilateral exchange rates and fluctu-
ation limits were set for the markka in relation to all the ERM currencies.
With the ERM’s fluctuation margins of approximately 15 %, the Deutsche-
mark intervention limits became FIM 3.53 and FIM 2.62. Within the ERM,
no intervention limits were defined against the ECU. In keeping with
the Maastricht Treaty, new currencies were no longer included in the ECU
basket. 
Finland’s membership in the ERM became effective on 14 October 1996.
The linkup went smoothly. The selected exchange rate level was a couple 
per cent weaker than the market rate and thus not far out of line with 
expectations. At the time of the linkup, the markka exchange rate vs. 
the Deutschemark remained in the region of FIM 2.99. In relation to its ECU
central rate, the Finnish markka was one of the strongest currencies within
the ERM.
In connection with the ERM linkup, the Bank of Finland announced that
it would continue to pursue the price stability objective but also underlined
the importance of exchange rate stability. The Bank’s objective was to keep
the markka quite stable within the ERM. The Bank intervened in the ex-
change market only to aminor extent, and in both directions, toward theend
of 1996.
The chosen exchange rate level was consistent with the final conversion
rate. In light of subsequent developments, the selected rate turned out to
be rather weak. With the clear depreciation of the ECU and with domestic
costs remaining fairly well contained, Finland’s international price compe-
titiveness remained exceptionally good over a long period of time. This was
mirrored e.g. in very large current account surpluses (6–7% of GDP) around
the millennium change.
6.2 The Government Sector Deficit and Decisions in Incomes
Policy
The performance of the Finnish economy was favourable as Stage Three
of EMU drew closer. Robust economic growth continued and unemployment
declined, though it remained among the highest in the EU countries. In
1997 inflation picked up slowly but still remained within the 2 % target.
Corporate profitability remained good and share prices rose partly due to
strong demand by non-residents. The central government deficit declined
rapidly. The government took a decision to keep total budget expenditure
roughly unchanged over the period 1998–2001.
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countries with excessive general government deficits. In 1996 the general
government (including the Finnish statutory earnings-related pension
scheme) deficit still exceeded 3 % of GDP but in 1997 the deficit had fallen
clearly below the reference value, actually close to 1 % of GDP as a result
of exceptionally good overall economic performance and strict adherence to
spending ceilings. Membership in the EU did not have remarkable effects
on government finances. Excluding the first year, Finland’s payments to
the EU slightly exceeded the corresponding receipts. The ratio of general
government debt to GDP had stayed below 60 %.
Membership in a single currency area of low inflation imposed a clear and
powerful restriction on incomes policy. The loss of the devaluation option
was recognised by labour market organisations on both sides. The trade
unions said they appreciated the importance of wage moderation, whereas
the employers announced that they would in principle refrain from de-
manding wage cuts. However, in the face of expected cyclical problems in
the EMU context as well, the government, together with the labour mar-
ket organisations, took measures to build up ‘cyclical buffer funds’.
In 1997 the central labour market organisations made an agreement to
build up two separate buffer funds, designed to smooth out fluctuations in
labour costs. It was decided that an amount representing nearly 0.5 % of
GDP would be set aside in an Unemployment Insurance Fund. The fund
serves to ensure that the rate of unemployment insurance contribution pay-
able by wage earners and employers can be kept unchanged in periods of
economic slack. Another, slightly larger, buffer fund was built up within
the statutory earnings-related pension scheme, for collection of pension con-
tributions from both employees and employers. Total assets in the funds
were estimated at 2–3 % of total wages.
This was not an entirely new approach in that contribution rates had also
in the past been adjusted in response to cyclical conditions. The funds will
remain small and their practical importance is far less than that of the de-
valuations of the past. It has also been suspected that timely usage of
the funds may be difficult. In any case, the funds are clearly of some im-
portance.
6.3 The Last Currency Speculation and Calmer Markets
With the changeover date, 1 January 1999, gradually becoming an es-
tablished fact and the situation stabilising within the ERM, market confi-
dence in the transition to a single currency strengthened. Consequently,
the prospective EMU currencies started to converge in terms of exchange
rates and interest rates. Considering also that the Bank of Finland deemed
it essential that the markka remain stable within the ERM, the scope for
an independent monetary policy started to diminish. The Bank’s manage-
ment nonetheless stressed that the responsibility for monetary policy would
remain with the Bank up until the very onset of Stage Three.
In January 1997 the Finnish markka surprisingly became the focus of hea-
vy speculation. This time, the pressure was upward, as foreign investors,
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behaviour was probably the view that the markka’s conversion rate would
be too low in light of the strong performance of the economy.
The Bank of Finland responded by purchasing foreign currency in such
large amounts that the foreign exchange reserves (incl. the forward position)
doubled in January. Representing more than 5 % of GDP, the interventions
were very large, even by international standards. Nonetheless, the Bank
eventually had to allow the markka to float at about 5 % stronger than its
Deutschemark central rate. Official interest rates were however kept un-
changed. Subsequently calm was suddenly restored and themarkka fell back
to its pre-appreciation level within a few days.
In the following months calm continued to prevail both in the Finnish fo-
reign exchange market and within the ERM. In 1998 various currencies
continued to come under pressure, strengthening pressure in the case of
the markka. However, only the central rate of the Irish pound was adjus-
ted.
Moderate upward pressure on prices prompted the Bank of Finland to rai-
se its tender rate to 3.25 % in September 1997. The conduct of an indepen-
dent interest rate policy was possible until the very onset of Stage Three
but not in practice, partly because of the general awareness of the tempo-
rary nature of interest rate hikes. Fortunately the balanced performance of
theFinnish economy continued. Inflation seemed to be settling below the2%
level.
As confidence in the use of the central rate as the final conversion rate
strengthened, convergence of interest rates and exchange rates continued.
Insofar as a country’s interest rate was higher than the German rate, its
currency had to be stronger too, to ensure that the depreciation was con-
sistent with the interest rate differential. In practice, this interest rate pa-
rity did not fully hold, even for the Finnish markka, which apparently con-
tinued to face a moderate risk of revaluation for the remainder of the time
before the start of Stage Three.
6.4 Changeover to the Single Currency and Single Monetary
Policy
The final major changes in the monetary policy framework of the Bank
of Finland were made in November 1997. The Bank began to apply two-
-week, instead of one-month, maturities in its tenders. Moreover, the quan-
titative limits on credit were abolished, but the collateral requirement re-
mained.
Markets were very calm in the year before the changeover and the final
decisions could be taken without major problems. Monetary policy conti-
nued to be relatively easy. However, the rate of inflation was already high-
er in Finland than the average rate for the prospective euro area countries,
which prompted a moderate increase in the tender rate to 3.4 % still in sp-
ring 1998.
Long-term yield differentials vs. Germany had narrowed to less than 50ba-
sis points already in the course of 1997 in all prospective EMU countries.
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sian financial crisis. The impact on ERM currencies, including the Finnish
markka, nonetheless remained subdued. At the time of the changeover to
the euro, the interest rate on the Finnish government 10-year bond was as
low as 4.0 %.
At the EU summit held on 2–3 May 1998, the heads of state and govern-
ment decided on the eleven countries that would be in the first wave to join
monetary union. Countries of importance to Finland, i. e. Sweden, Denmark
and the United Kingdom, did not join in the first wave, which was a dis-
appointment to Finland, considering Finland’s volume of trade with these
countries, which was roughly the same as that with the first wave count-
ries.
In connection with the summit, a pre-announcement was issued on the bi-
lateral conversion rates for the prospective euro area currencies to be fixed
on 1 January 1999 and an assurance that they would no longer be chan-
ged. These decisions had a stabilising effect on the money and foreign ex-
change markets. Following the decisions taken at the summit, the Euro-
pean Central Bank commenced operations on 1 June 1998. The Governor
of the Bank of Finland was elected to the first six-member Executive 
Board of the ECB. She and the new governor both became members of
the Governing Council.
The ECB’s monetary policy strategy differed from the inflation targeting
strategy applied by the Bank of Finland. However, the monetary policy in-
struments of the ECB closely resembled the arsenal that had been in use
by the Bank of Finland.
At the December meeting of the ECB Council it was agreed that the na-
tional central banks adopt a harmonised steering rate of 3 %, which then
became the initial rate for the single monetary policy. The Bank of Finland
took its last interest rate decisions on 3 December 1998 when it lowered
the tender rate from 3.4 % to 3.0 %, and the base rate was set at 3.5 %.
The rate cut was not well suited to the strong performance of the economy.
This concern was further heightened by the reversal in early 1999 of the up-
ward trend in the euro exchange rate witnessed toward the end of 1998.
Domestic costs could however be surprisingly well contained.
At the EU’s summit in May the final conversion rates against the euro
could not yet be fixed because the Maastricht Treaty did not allow changes
in the value of the euro in connection with the changeover. The problem
was due to the fact that the currencies in the ECU basket were not identi-
cal with the prospective EMU currencies. It was only in the evening of
the last day of 1998 and on the basis of the exchange rates then prevailing
that the EU Council fixed the conversion rates against the euro. The mark-
ka’s rate was to be 5.94573 per euro.
7. Concluding Remarks
Over the course of a little more than ten years, the Finnish money and
foreign exchange markets had undergone a profound transition. Financial
market restrictions, of a regulatory nature, had been lifted. The liberalisa-
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being the most serious one. However, at the same time the financial system
developed favourably and became increasingly globalised.
Finnish foreign exchange policy has actually been carried out within all
theforeign exchange regimes, starting with financial market regulation and
a fixed exchange rate regime. The liberalisation of capital flows in the late
1980s resulted in the loss of monetary policy independence, and attempts
at pursuing an independent monetary policy led to successive speculative
attacks against the currency and ultimately to the collapse of the peg in
1992. A monetary policy strategy based on the price stability objective un-
der the floating exchange rate was introduced in 1993. This strategy pro-
ved very effective in the following years. Membership in the ERM in 1996
again brought the fixed exchange rate objective to the surface, although this
time without tensions. Commitment to monetary union paved the way for
the changeover from a national monetary policy to the single currency and
single monetary policy of the EU at the start of 1999.
In Finland the adjustment to a single currency proceeded surprisingly
well in the final years before adoption of the euro. This was clearly a con-
sequence of the economic crisis of the early 1990s, which – though in itself
very severe and expensive – had brought balance to areas of the economy
which had traditionally given rise to problems. Problem areas included in-
flation in particular and cost developments in general, as well as the con-
tinuous tendency of the economy toward overindebtedness. The realism fol-
lowing in the wake of the crisis provided a strong foundation for parti-
cipation in a single monetary union that sets very strict criteria for econo-
mic performance.
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Finnish Monetary and Foreign Exchange Policy 
on the Way towards the Euro
Tapio KORHONEN – Bank of Finland, Economics Department (tapio.korhonen@bof.fin)
This paper presents the salient aspects of Finland’s monetary and exchange rate
policies during the run-up to monetary union in the 1990s. In the course of slightly
more than a decade, Finland’s monetary and exchange rate policies were thoroughly
revamped. There were serious problems associated with the liberalisation process
in the early part of the decade, the most noteworthy being an economic and ban-
king crisis. Finland’s financial system nonetheless developed rapidly. As regards ex-
change rate policy, almost all varieties of exchange rate regime were tried. A fixed
rate regime based on a currency index fell apart in the early part of the decade and
was replaced by a floating rate system. Later, in 1993, this was combined with an in-
flation-targeting monetary policy strategy. At thestart of 1995 Finland joined theEu-
ropean Union, and in October 1996 the markka was joined to the EU’s Exchange
Rate Mechanism. The improvement in financial and price stability that followed
the economic crisis facilitated the adjustment to the euro area’s single currency and
single monetary policy at the start of 1999, which was accomplished without seri-
ous problems.
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